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NOTES
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND BAKER v. CARR
Robert M. Crea*
I. INTRODUCTION
Baker v. Carr' and the reapportionment cases that followed2 reshaped representa-
tive government at the state level through the principle of "one voter, one vote." Some
scholars have declared that Baker, the seminal case on reapportionment, has nothing to
do with racial discrimination.3 The case, they argue, regards only the representative
imbalance between urban and rural areas.4 This Note argues that such a viewpoint is
overly narrow. At the time the Court was deliberating over Baker, malapportionment
regularly entailed racially discriminatory effects, especially in the southeast.
Prior to Baker, a number of academics stressed the racial implications of malappor-
tionment. Harvard professor of government, V.0. Key, wrote in 1950 that "by the over-
representation of rural counties in State legislatures, the whites of the black belts gain an
extremely disproportionate strength in State lawmaking."'  Such overrepresentation
gave excessive weight "to those areas in general the most conservative and in particular
the most irreconcilable on the Negro issue." 6 C. Vann Woodward, a history professor at
Yale and author of The Strange Career of Jim Crow,7 observed that malapportionment
encouraged southern intransigence to desegregation: "[Malapportionment has placed
political control] in the hands of a small and often reactionary oligarchy," thereby "kill-
ing.., needed social legislation" and promoting "interference with local public schools
and their peaceful adjustment to Federal law." 8 Notwithstanding such statements, Baker
too often gets categorized as a non-racial case. The imbalance in urban/rural representa-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.A., Columbia University, 1998.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Within a year of the Baker decision, seventy-five cases had been filed in state and federal courts
seeking relief from malapportionment. See ROYCE HANSON, THE POLITICAL THICKET: REAPPORTIONMENT
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 57 (1966).
3. See, e.g., ROBERT G. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
POLITICS 142 (1968). In their dissenting opinions in Baker, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan both assert that
race was not an issue. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see id. at 335 (Harlan J., dis-
senting). Charles Rhyne, Baker's attorney, also declares at oral argument that race was not an issue. See 56
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 551 (1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS].
4. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see id. at 335 (Harlan J., dissenting).
5. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: VOTING 114 (1961) (quoting V.0. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS
666 (1950)) [hereinafter U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: VOTING].
6. Id.
7. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955).
8. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: VOTING, supra note 5, at 114.
Journal of Legislation
tion entailed a racial question because legislative malapportionment sometimes masked
state-sponsored racism.
9
This Note begins in Part II with a brief overview of the history and holding of
Baker. Part III analyzes the issue of malapportionment at the time the Supreme Court
heard the case, particularly as it affected African Americans. This part reveals that a
number of significant political leaders recognized the racial implications of malappor-
tionment, indicating why reapportionment was an important issue for the voter registra-
tion movement. Part IV identifies Baker's placement within the broader civil rights
movement and reveals that a few cases preceding Baker indicate that a number of Su-
preme Court justices were conscious of the racial implications of malapportionment.
Part V then answers the objections of scholars who contend that Baker is not a race-
based case. Part VI details Justice Frankfurter's views on why he believed Baker did
not pose a racial question-a weighty consideration against the position of this Note
given his historical advocacy of civil rights. Part VII looks into the aftermath of the
Baker decision and infers that Baker contributed to the passage three years later of the
Voter Rights Act of 1965, a federal law passed to improve African Americans' access to
the ballot box.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF BAKER V. CARR
Charles Baker and several other voters brought an action for declaratory judgment
that Tennessee's 1901 Apportionment Act ("Act"), under which seats in the state legis-
lature were apportioned, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.' o The state constitution required government officials to enumerate qualified
voters and reapportion accordingly every ten years so that each state legislator repre-
sented a similar number of constituents." Baker argued that the Act violated the state
and federal constitutions because state officials neglected to count voters immediately
following the Act's ratification and to recount voters every ten years following the sign-
ing of the Act. 12 Owing to the significant growth in population in urban relative to rural
areas, the plaintiffs argued that Tennessee's legislature unfairly favored rural over urban
voters. This malapportionment resulted in roughly one-third of the state's voters con-
trolling two-thirds of its representatives. 13 Although not mentioned in the appellant's
brief to the Supreme Court, African American voters suffered disproportionately as a
result of this malapportionment because of their migration from rural to urban districts
during the previous sixty years.' 4 The malapportionment in Tennessee manifested itself
in state legislative proposals not just in the area of race relations but also, for example,
9. See GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER
AND THE SUPREME COURT 34-35 (1966) (indicating that Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi possessed some
of the most unbalanced legislatures in the country).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.").
11. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 188-89.
12. See id. at 187-88.
13. See id. at 253 (Clark, J. concurring); see also HOWARD BALL, THE WARREN COURT'S CONCEPTIONS
OF DEMOCRACY: AN EVALUATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S APPORTIONMENT OPINIONS 93 (197 1).
14. See David Johnson, Important Cities in Black History, available at
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/bhmcities 1.html.
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in the refusal of the state legislature to repeal the prohibition against the teaching of
evolution and its refusal to allow taverns in the counties. 5
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Baker case presented two issues: the first of ju-
risdiction and the second of the merits of the constitutional claim. The District Court of
the United States for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed the suit on the prece-
dent set by Colegrove v. Green, a 1946 case from Illinois involving similar facts and
claims for which Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion and from which Justices Black
and Douglas dissented. 16 Colegrove did not involve a question of racial discrimination.
Justice Frankfurter justified affirming the lower court's dismissal in Colegrove on the
basis that not doing so would embroil the Court in political controversy and compromise
the integrity of the judiciary in the public eye. "The short of it is that the Constitution
has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the
States in the popular House and left to that House determination whether States have
fulfilled their responsibility." 17 Justice Frankfurter then asserted, using language similar
to that in his Baker dissent, "Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy
for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or
to invoke the ample powers of Congress."'18 Accordingly, relief should come not from
the courts but through the political process.
Justice Black's dissent in Colegrove, which Justice Douglas joined, foreshadowed
the reasoning that would dominate Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Baker. Justice
Black argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
voter discrimination on the basis of geography. 19 Justice Frankfurter did not address this
question. Rather, he limited his plurality opinion solely to the political question doctrine
because he believed the jurisdictional issue dispositive. In failing to respond to Justice
Black's contention, Justice Frankfurter foreclosed an opportunity to narrow the scope of
the Equal Protection Clause in a manner that might have stymied the majority's reason-
ing in Baker.
Records indicate that at the initial conference on Baker, Justices Warren, Black,
Douglas, and Brennan favored holding that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized the
lower courts both to assert jurisdiction and determine the remedy. 20 Ultimately, the
majority opinion limited itself to the more narrow issue of jurisdiction as an accommo-
dation to Justice Stewart, who declared that he would vote for reversal only if the major-
ity so limited its decision.21 Despite adopting this more narrow holding, Justice Brennan
masterfully addressed the political question doctrine described in Colegrove so as to
prevent the Court from dismissing future jurisdictional questions outside of matters
touching on foreign relations, war, and the status of Indian tribes.
By holding that the district court possessed jurisdiction but not answering whether
the lower court could provide a remedy, Justice Brennan, in the opinion of Justice
Harlan, managed to decide the question of remedy "sub silentio. 2  In effect, Justice
15. See BALL, supra note 13, at 94.
16. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
17. Id. at 554.
18. Id. at 556.
19. See id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting)
20. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHY 412 (1983).
21. For an interesting history of the intra-Court politics on this point, see id. at 415-19.
22. Baker, 369 U.S. at 331 (Harlan J., dissenting).
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Brennan subtly conflated the question of remedy with the Equal Protection Clause so as
to suggest that every vote must be weighted similarly for voter apportionment to be
constitutional. Justice Frankfurter agreed with Justice Harlan, arguing that "to promul-
gate jurisdiction in the abstract is meaningless. It is as devoid of reality as 'a brooding
omnipresence in the sky,' for it conveys no intimation of what relief, if any, a District
Court is capable of affording that would not invite legislatures to play ducks and drakes
with the judiciary. 23  Justice Frankfurter declared that in the history of the United
States, "republicanism" has never implied an equal weighting of votes:
The notion that representation proportioned to the geographic spread of population is
so universally accepted as a necessary element of equality between man and man that
it must be taken to be the standard of a political equality preserved by the Fourteenth
Amendment-that it is, in appellant's words "the basic principle of representative
govemment"-is, to put it bluntly, not true.
24
Even though Justice Brennan's holding ostensibly only touched upon jurisdiction
without going so far as to assert that representative government means one voter, one
vote, many failed to pick up on this subtle distinction. President Kennedy, in a press
conference in which he discussed Baker, declared, "The right to fair representation and
to have each vote count equally is, it seems to me, basic to the successful operation of a
,,25democracy. Notwithstanding President Kennedy's distillation of the case, the Court
did not declare the one voter, one vote doctrine until Reynolds v. Sims,26 three years
later.
III. THE ISSUE OF MALAPPORTIONMENT
Between 1900 and 1960, the urban population of the United States grew signifi-
cantly. While only about 40% of Americans lived in urban areas in 1900, roughly 63%
lived in urban areas in 1960.27 Despite this migration, rurally-dominated state legisla-
tures failed to reapportion themselves, often in contravention of their own state constitu-
tions.28 Although southern states exhibited some of the most egregious forms of repre-
sentative imbalance,29 malapportionment was by no means a southern phenomenon.3 °
The problem affected state legislatures throughout the country.
A. African American Urban Migration
The African American community amplified the general population trend to the cit-
ies. In 1910, 89% of all blacks lived in the South, and 80% of these lived in rural ar-
23. Id. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 301 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
25. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 425.
26. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
27. See U.S. Census Bureau, Population: 1790 to 1990, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf.
28. See BAKER, supra note 9, at 54-60.
29. See id. at 34-35. (indicating that Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi possessed some of the most
unbalanced legislatures in the country).
30. See id. at 32-33.
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eas.3" By 1960, 40% of all blacks lived outside the South, while 75% of all blacks lived
in the cities. 32 In the decade between 1950 and 1960, all twenty-two American cities
with a population greater than five hundred thousand showed an increase in the percent-
age of non-white residents. 33 Owing to "white flight" in response to desegregation,
seven of these cities lost between 6.7% and 33.3% of their Caucasian population during
this time. 34 Thus, by the time Baker reached the Court, the black population had trans-
formed itself into an urban one, and American cities had become more heterogeneous.
The general misrepresentation of urban voters relative to rural voters in many states
translated to proportionately greater misrepresentation of blacks. 35 Discriminatory prac-
tices like poll taxes and literacy tests further aggravated this malapportionment by pre-
venting African Americans from accessing the ballot box.36
Malapportionment in the South was used sometimes as a weapon to minimize the
African American vote.37 Its potency was enhanced by the fact that it was the intangible
product of omission rather than overt discrimination, effectively shielding it from Fif-
teenth Amendment based claims.38 The most seriously underrepresented central city
counties were all in the South-the counties incorporating Atlanta, Miami, Houston, and
Dallas.39 Evidencing the imbalance in representation in Tennessee in 1950, the state at
issue in Baker, Memphis possessed 312,000 voters and seven representatives in the state
legislature. The twenty-four surrounding counties had an identical, total population and
twenty-six representatives.'n Blacks in Memphis represented 36% of the population in
the 1950s.
41
B. Public Recognition of the Problem
Many believed that improving representation of urban interests would enhance ra-
cial comity. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, for example, thought that "the long-
term success of the civil rights movement depended more on gaining strength through
elective power than through specific acts of desegregation. 4 2 While running for Presi-
dent in the late 1950s, Senator John F. Kennedy made reapportionment a campaign plat-
form, although he did not make race an explicit issue in his position on apportionment.43
In an article written in 1958, Senator Kennedy declared that "[t]he apportionment of
31. See David Johnson, Important Cities in Black History, available at
http://www.infoplease.con/spot/bhmcitiesl.html.
32. Id.
33. See BALL, supra note 13, at 61.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: VOTING, supra note 5, at 135.
37. See South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 278 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting); LEO KATCHER, EARL
WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 434 (1967).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
39. See REPRESENTATION AND APPORTIONMENT: RESPONSE OF THE NATION TO THE SUPREME COURT'S
LANDMARK DECISIONS ON STATE LEGISLATURE APPORTIONMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 11
(1966).
40. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 379 (1997).
41. See GENE GRAHAM, ONE MAN ONE VOTE: BAKER V. CARR AND THE AMERICAN LEVELLERS 18
(1972).
142. DAVID MICHAEL HUDSON, ALONG RACIAL LINES: CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS
ACT 22 (1999).
43. See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 217.
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representation in our legislatures and (to a lesser extent) in Congress has been either
deliberately rigged or shamefully ignored so as to deny the cities and the voters that full
and proportionate voice in government to which they are entitled."44 Evidence also
suggests that Chief Justice Warren believed that if African Americans in the South had
been permitted proper representation in government, then democratic means might have
solved many of the nation's racial problems.45
While the Court was deliberating over Baker, the Kennedy Administration on Sep-
tember 9, 1961 published the 1961 Commission on Civil Rights Report on Voting,
46
roughly five months after oral argument and six months before the Court released its
decision.47 This report described how malapportionment disproportionately affected
regions consisting mostly of African Americans and other minorities. 48 The report as-
serted that outright discrimination and overt actions to prevent African Americans from
voting produced or exaggerated the effects of malapportionment.49 The coincident pub-
lication of this report with the Supreme Court's deliberations over Baker should not be
underestimated. Reapportionment was an important issue for the Kennedy Administra-
tion, and the timing of this report's publication suggests that the Administration sought
to use it to communicate its opinion on reapportionment to the judiciary.
C. Reapportionment as a Part of the Voter Registration Movement
Voter registration was a critical focus of the civil rights movement.50 For example,
between 1896 and 1900, African American registration in Louisiana declined from
130,334 to 5,320 owing to structural discrimination through literacy tests and gerryman-
dering. 51 By the early 1940s, African American voter registration in southern states
remained woefully near where it had been since the beginning of the century, at ap-
proximately 2.4% of the black voting-age population.52
Due to aggressive efforts undertaken by the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) and other organizations, black voter registration be-
gan to rise in the middle of the twentieth century.53 Black voter registration in the South
continued rising from 12% in 1947 to 25% in 1956. 54 However, because of more than
fifty years of legislative inaction in many states, particularly in the South, malappor-
tionment mitigated the effects of improved voter registration.
The civil rights movement took note of the Baker decision. Only four months after
the Court delivered its decision, The Crisis, the NAACP's monthly journal of activities
in the Civil Rights movement, included an article discussing the significant improve-
ment in voter registration among African Americans in Tennessee.5 5 Also testifying to
44. John F. Kennedy, Shame of the States, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), May 18, 1958, at 12. This article
does not explicitly mention race in its discussion of urban interests.
45. GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 22.
46. See BALL, supra note 13, at 64.
47. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: VOTING, supra note 5. See also infra Table I.
48. See BALL, supra note 13, at 64.
49. See id.
50. See HUDSON, supra note 42, at 53.
51. See id. at 17.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 19.
54. See id.
55. See Tennessee Registration Drive, THE CRISIS, August/September 1962, at 412. The article, however,
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the impact on the civil rights movement of Baker and the Court's subsequent reappor-
tionment decisions on the civil rights movement, a number of marchers during Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s 1965 march in Selma to improve voter registration56 wore ACLU
buttons advertising "one man, one vote. Although not a slogan originating in the
Baker case, this slogan was a motto of the broader reapportionment movement. This
slogan embodied the view of representative government that the Court ultimately
adopted in Reynolds v. Sims in 1964.58
IV. BAKER IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
As Table 1 indicates, the petitioners in Baker filed their appeal following a se-
quence of historic events within the civil rights movement. Three significant events
occurred between when the appellants in Baker filed their petition and when the Court
found probable jurisdiction. First, the nation elected John F. Kennedy president. Sec-
ond, the Kennedy Administration published the 1961 Commission on Civil Rights Re-
port on Voting while the Court was in the midst of deliberations over Baker.59 Third,
and perhaps most important for the outcome of Baker, the Court heard argument on
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,6° a case involving racially-motivated gerrymandering. Gerry-
mandering, as defined by the 1961 Commission on Civil Rights Report on Voting, is
"political districting in which, although voting strength may be proportionate, district
lines are drawn in such a way as to put particular groups of voters into, or out of, par-
ticular districts for the purpose of limiting the effectiveness of their votes."6 1 Baker,
unlike Gomillion, involved a case of malapportionment, which the Commission defined
as "political districting in which one group of voters has disproportionate strength as
against other groups of voters in the same election., 62 Both malapportionment and ger-
rymandering can be manipulated so as to effectuate racial discrimination. 63 The princi-
pal difference between Gomillion and Baker is that the claim in Gomillion alleged ra-
cism while the claim in Baker limited its allegations to geographical discrimination.
The claim in Baker was broader insofar as it claimed that legislative inaction resulted in
geographical discrimination favoring rural areas at the expense of urban areas. Nonethe-
less, a previous case, South v. Peters,64 a case pre-dating Baker by twelve years, re-
vealed to the Court how malapportionment could serve racist ends.
does not expressly reference Baker.
56. See HUDSON, supra note 42, at 53. (Martin Luther King, Jr. targeted Selma because the local sheriff
could be counted on to overreact to peaceful demonstrations and because only 156 of 7,500 African Americans
in Selma, representing 56% of the town's population, were registered to vote).
57. See EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS 1954-1965 (PBS video 1986).
58. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
59. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: VOTING, supra note 5. This report was released on September 9,
1961.
60. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
61. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: VOTING, supra note 5, at 113.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 278 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting); KATCHER, supra note
37, at 434.
64. 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
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Table 1 - Baker v. Carr Timeline65
Date Event
l 5/17/54 Brown v. Board of Education I - Holding prohibiting segregation
-. 5/31/55 Brown v. Board of Education II- "All Deliberate Speed" Decided
01 8/28/55 Emmett Till kidnapped and murdered
- 12/5/55 Montgomery bus boycott begins, led by MLK, Jr.
3/12/56 Southern manifesto from Congress pledging to overrule Brown
M 9/29/56 Brennan appointed
- 12/3/56 Kidd v. McCanless denied certiorari
9/3/57 First day of classes at Central High School, Little Rock, AR
9/9/57 Civil Rights Act of 1957 (first since Reconstruction), creates Civil Rights Commission
- 5 iii9/24/57 Federal troops to Little Rock
CO i: :ii: : /; :9/1/58 Public Schools in Little Rock closed for a year
9/12158 Cooper v. Aaron decided
1/30/60 Gomillion v. Lightfoot notice of appeal filed
2/1/60 Sit-ins begin in Greensboro, NC
1/21/60 Petition for certiorari in Gomillion v. Lighfoot granted!ii:: iiiiiiiiii4/1/60 SNCC formed, Raleigh, NC
iliiiii!iiiiiii;iiiii5/4/60 Freedom Riders leave Washington, DC by bus
::i::ii -i::i:i5/6/60 Eisenhower signs Civil Rights Act
i:::i:ii:: i:i 15/14/60 Freedom Riders assaulted in Anniston, AL
iiiiii:i;i ; ; 15/26160 Baker v. Carr appellants file notice of appeal
1i: :: ~:: : i lt0/18/60 Gomillion v. Lightfoot argued
liiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii11/8/60 Kennedy elected president
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii1111 60 Gomillion v. Lightfoot decided
111/21/60 Baker v. Carr - Court finds probable jurisdiction
4/19/61 Baker v. Carr argued
: .:9/9/61 Publication of 1961 Commission on Civil Rights Report on Voting
3/26/62 Baker v. Carr decided
A. South v. Peters-Justice Douglas' Early Recognition of the Racial Implications of
Malapportionment
Justice Douglas' dissent in South v. Peters indicates his awareness that malappor-
tionment could mask state-sponsored racial discrimination. This 1950 case challenged
the county unit system in Georgia-a system that based legislative representation on
counties rather than population.67 This system resulted in a vote from some rural coun-
ties being worth more than 120 times a vote from Fulton County, the location of At-
lanta.68 The Court, in a per curiam opinion, cited Colegrove in dismissing the appel-
lant's claim for not presenting a justiciable issue.69
Justice Douglas, however, believed that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment made the matter justiciable. 70 He also argued that the rurally domi-
nated Georgia legislature used the county unit system to deprive African Americans of
their voting power.
65. Case information taken from Court records.
66. See Peters, 339 U.S. at 277 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black concurred with Justice Douglas'
dissenting opinion. Id.
67. 339 U.S. at 277 (per curiam).
68. 339 U.S. at 278 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 277.
70. Id. at 277 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Population figures show that there is a heavy Negro population in the large cities.
There is testimony in the record that only in those areas have Negroes been able to
vote in important numbers. Yet the County Unit System heavily disenfranchises that
urban Negro population. The County Unit System has indeed been called the "last
loophole" around our decisions holding that there must be no discrimination because
of race in primary as well as in general elections. The racial angle of the case only
emphasizes the bite of the decision which sustains the County Unit System of vot-
ing.
71
The record, to which Justice Douglas refers, provides impressive evidence that
Georgia officials sought to disenfranchise black voters through malapportionment.
While South v. Peters was at trial, then Governor Eugene Talmadge declared that "[t]his
Master Plan crowd [those seeking to make representation based on population rather
than on geography] seeks to destroy our traditional Democratic White Primary and our
County Unit System of voting. Destruction of one, they know will make the death of
the other an easy matter for them., 72 A few months later, Governor Talmadge declared
during a radio interview, "There is more behind this suit [South v. Peters] than meets the
eye. It is part of a master plan-to disfranchise the white people in rural areas and en-
franchise the great horde of bloc voters in urban areas. 73 A footnote provided in the
Court's record mentions that the term "bloc voters" was a well-understood and notorious
euphemism for African American voters.74
Indicating the degree to which the general public recognized the county unit system
as an instrument of racial disenfranchisement, the appellants in South v. Peters cite a
contemporary regional newspaper article in a motion to the Court stating that:
The County Unit System thus "heavily disfranchises the Negro population. Almost
half of Georgia's Negroes live in the most populous counties. Here the Negro vote
has been large. But the County Unit System cancels the Negro vote in these coun-
ties-the only counties where the Negroes have been able to vote in important num-
bers. In small counties, where any single vote is at a premium, Negroes generally
have been denied the franchise."
' 75
It would therefore seem that much of the public, many politicians, and at least some
members of the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the racial implications
of malapportionment as early as 1950.
Thirteen years following South v. Peters, shortly after the Court had decided Baker,
a new suit challenging Georgia's county unit system appeared before the Court. Gray v.
Sanders was filed in the Northern District of Georgia literally within hours of the Baker
decision.76 Reaching the Supreme Court in 1963, Justice Douglas wrote an almost
71. Id. at 278 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72. Brief for Appellant on Petition for Rehearing at 13 n.1 1, South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (quot-
ing The Statesman (Editor: The People; Associate Editor: Eugene Talmadge) December 19, 1946).
73. Id.
74. Id. (explaining Talmadge's terminology).
75. Motion to Advance and Expedite Hearing and Disposition of Case and Brief in Support Thereof for
Appellant at 14, South v. Peters 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (quoting New South (Southern Regional Council, At-
lanta, GA), Vol. 4, Nos. 5&6, 1949)).
76. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). See CRAY, supra note 40, at 384.
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unanimous majority opinion that overturned South v. Peters.7 7 In Toombs v. Fortson, a
similar case filed contemporaneously with Gray v. Sanders, the Northern District of
Georgia held that the state senate's distribution of members unconstitutional.78  The
legislature reapportioned itself in response, resulting in the election of the first African
American senator in Georgia since Reconstruction.79
B. Kidd v. McCanless-The Decision to Find Probable Jurisdiction in Baker
Justice Frankfurter began his dramatic dissent in Baker by declaring, "The Court
today reverses a uniform course of decision established by a dozen cases, including one
by which the very claim now sustained was unanimously rejected only five years ago.
'8°
Justice Frankfurter neither supports this striking statement with a footnote nor mentions
this case by name. A little research indicates that the case to which he refers is Kidd v.
McCanless.8' A comparison of Kidd and Baker reveals almost identical facts. The dif-
ferences between the two are mostly procedural. One significant difference is that while
the plaintiffs in Baker initiated their suit in a federal district court,82 the plaintiffs in
Kidd brought their claim in a Tennessee court. 83 Also, unlike the district court that dis-
missed the Baker suit for want of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, the lower court
in Kidd ordered the state legislature to reapportion its districts on the basis that the 1901
Act in question had expired.84 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Kidd
reversed the lower court on the theory that declaring the expiration of the 1901 Act
meant that the state legislature operated unconstitutionally. 85 Because an unconstitu-
tionally-formed legislature could not theoretically reappropriate itself in a constitutional
manner, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the decision.86
The Court that denied certiorari on Kidd was largely the same as the one that found
probable jurisdiction in Baker only five years later. Within this timeframe, only two
justices had been replaced. Justice Stewart replaced Justice Burton and Justice
Whittaker replaced Justice Reed. Interestingly, a review of the denial of certiorari indi-
cates that the Court justified its decision on Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove.
87
One would think that Justices Black and Douglas might have dissented in the decision to
deny certiorari to Kidd given their dissents in Colegrove and South v. Peters. Neverthe-
less, the denial in Kidd was unanimous, 88 implying perhaps that the Court in 1956
viewed Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion regarding voter apportionment as uncon-
troversial. Another possibility is that the more liberal wing of the Court believed the
placement of Kidd in a Tennessee court, with its claims based more on the state constitu-
77. Justice Harlan dissented. See Gray, 372 U.S. at 382 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
79. See HANSON, supra note 2, at 58.
80. 369 U.S. at 266-67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
81. 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
82. 369 U.S. at 188.
83. 292 S.W.2d 40,41 (Tenn. 1956).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id.
87. 352 U.S. at 920.
88. Justice Frankfurter refers to the decision as unanimous in his dissenting opinion. Baker, 369 U.S. at
266-67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The actual decision dismissing the petition, however, is a per curiam
opinion that does not expressly state whether it was unanimous. 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
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tion than on the federal constitution, made the justification of federal jurisdiction on
such a political issue too difficult. Perhaps the more liberal wing, therefore, decided to
bide its time for a better opportunity to shelve the political question doctrine of Cole-
grove and to extend a broader interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
A number of significant historical events in the civil rights movement also occurred
between when the Court denied certiorari in Kidd and when it found probable jurisdic-
tion in Baker, as Table 1 illustrates. Just to name a few, the nation witnessed the riots in
Little Rock in response to school desegregation, the beginning of sit-in protests, and the
assault on the Freedom Riders. These events very well could have influenced the jus-
tices and made them more receptive to Baker's claim than they were to Kidd's claim
five years earlier. Following the Court's decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,8 9 the major-
ity of the Court also possessed a strong enough legal foundation to challenge Cole-
grove's political question doctrine and declare apportionment questions justiciable.
C. Gomillion v. Lightfoot-The Warren Court Becomes Aware of the Problem
A week prior to the Supreme Court's finding probable jurisdiction in Baker v.
Carr,90 the Court held unanimously in Gomillion v. Lightfoot that redistricting so as to
discriminate against African Americans violated the Fifteenth Amendment.9' The tim-
ing of Baker with respect to Gomillion suggests an association by the majority of the
Court between racially-animated voter discrimination and the broader topic of ur-
ban/rural discrimination. At least one author has gone so far as to suggest that Gomil-
lion opened Chief Justice Warren's eyes as to how legislative apportionment could ef-
fect state-sponsored racial discrimination and encouraged the Court to find probable
jurisdiction in Baker.
92
The petitioners in Gomillion were African American residents of the City of Tuske-
gee, Alabama. They brought an action in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama, seeking a declaratory judgment that the legislature's redistricting of
Tuskegee from a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure denied them equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.93 The redistricting resulted in the removal from the city of all but four or five of
its 400 black voters while not removing a single white voter or resident.94 The district
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.95 The court of appeals subsequently affirmed.96
89. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
90. Court documents indicate that the appellants in Baker v. Carr filed their petition on May 26, 1960.
The Court heard argument on Gomillion on October 18, 1960. The Court decided Gomillion on November 14,
1960 and found probable jurisdiction on Baker on November 21, 1960.
91. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 348.
92. See CRAY, supra note 40, at 381. Although it is certainly plausible that Gomillion awakened Chief
Justice Warren to how malapportionment could disguise racial policies, Cray bases this statement upon an
apparent speculation.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XV § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
94. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
95. 167 F. Supp. 405 (D.C. Ala. 1958).
96. 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
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Chief Justice Warren, as a testament to his oft-touted genius in assigning opinions, 97
delegated responsibility for the opinion to Justice Frankfurter, thereby giving the author
of Colegrove an opportunity to distinguish the two cases and to comment on how the
Constitution addressed the facts of Gomillion. In his opinion, Justice Frankfurter pro-
vided a more nuanced analysis of the political question doctrine he crafted in Colegrove.
Above all else, Justice Frankfurter wanted to ensure that the Court's record on civil
rights remained unblemished.98 To do so, he had to hold that the political question doc-
trine could not completely shield state legislative conduct from judicial review. Justice
Frankfurter wrote, "[T]he Court has never acknowledged that the States have power to
do as they will with municipal corporations regardless of consequences. Legislative
control of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant
limitations imposed by the United States Constitution."99 In so holding, though, Justice
Frankfurter implied that the political question doctrine did not provide an absolute shield
for state legislative conduct. With this concession, Justice Frankfurter also undermined
the principal barrier to the Court's hearing of Baker.
Justice Frankfurter apparently sought to cushion this blow to the political question
doctrine by emphasizing that because of the racial implications in Gomillion, the Fif-
teenth Amendment provided the jurisdiction and remedy. He was notably silent as to
the relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment, the basis of the claim in Baker. While
Justice Douglas signed on to Justice Frankfurter's opinion, he adhered to his dissent in
Colegrove that the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes constitutional authority for hear-
ing claims regarding voter apportionment.'00 In the only concurring opinion in Gomil-
lion, Justice Whittaker also contended that the Equal Protection Clause provides suffi-
cient authority for district courts to find jurisdiction over such claims, thereby making
the majority's insistence on the Fifteenth Amendment redundant. 10'
By implying that the political question doctrine was not an absolute shield and not
clarifying his opinion as to the application of the Equal Protection Clause to non-racial
apportionment claims, Justice Frankfurter provided the more activist wing of the Court
with sufficient grounds to challenge Colegrove's ability to dispose of Baker. Much to
Justice Frankfurter's chagrin, Justices Warren, Brennan, Douglas, and Black all voted to
find probable jurisdiction in Baker a week after the Court released its opinion on Gomil-
lion, with the remaining justices justifying their contrary vote on the precedent of Cole-
102grove.
V. THE ARGUMENT FOR WHY BAKER HAS NOTHING TO Do WITH RACE
The best argument for why race is not an issue in Baker is because neither the vari-
ous briefs nor the majority opinion address it. Moreover, at oral argument, Justice
Douglas asked Charles Rhyne, Baker's attorney, "This [case] is not an inequality based
upon racial discrimination, is it? °1 0 3 In answer, Rhyne declared that the case had noth-
97. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 418.
98. See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 223.
99. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344-45.
100. See id. at 348.
101. See id. at 349.
102. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 411-12.
103. See 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 3, at 551.
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ing to do with racial discrimination. °4 At first glance, given the Court's recent holding
in Gomillion, it would seem that Mr. Rhyne underestimated the Court's responsiveness
to race-based claims. However, had Rhyne argued that the case presented a race issue,
he risked having the Court either affirm the district court's dismissal for failure to state a
claim or provide a narrower holding on the Fifteenth Amendment that would bar a gen-
eral recovery to urban voters. To obtain the appropriate recovery, Rhyne needed a hold-
ing based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not tied exclu-
sively to any specific minority group.
That Justice Douglas asked Rhyne about the possibility of Baker presenting a race-
based issue is significant insofar as he dissented in South v. Peters by arguing that
malapportionment in Georgia masked state-sponsored racial discrimination. 10 5 Justice
Douglas recognized the racial implications of the legislative imbalance between urban
and rural districts. His position on the power of the Fourteenth Amendment to address
claims of apportionment also had been consistent, at least since he had joined Justice
Black's dissent to Colegrove v. Green in 1946. In this dissent, Justice Black argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment empowered the Court to find jurisdiction over questions of
legislative apportionment at the state level.1
0 6
Despite Rhyne's unwillingness to make a race-based argument, Rhyne's choice of
words in his brief and at oral argument evinced an awareness of the Court's sensitivity
to racial matters. His brief included a section entitled "[G]eographic discrimination and
racial discrimination are equally onerous." 107 This section addressed the artificiality of
any distinction between racial and geographic discrimination and cited cases using the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fifteenth Amendment to strike down discrimina-
tory laws. 10 8 At oral argument, Rhyne was even more direct:
I think it is a fair summary of the facts to say, as Mr. Chandler has said so many
times, that the real question here is whether or not you are going to have two classes
of citizenship in Tennessee, half slave and half free, or at least one-third free and two-
thirds slave, because there is no way that you can get out of this illegal strait-jacket
without some federal assistance.l°9
Archibald Cox, the Solicitor General for the United States who participated as an
amicus curiae on behalf of Baker, employed similar rhetoric at oral argument when
distinguishing Gomillion: "It is unsound to distinguish Gomillion from the present case
on the ground that it arose under the Fifteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects the right to vote ... and arbitrary geographical distinctions are scarcely
less invidious than discriminations based upon race."" 0
Although both Cox and Rhyne kept race-based arguments to a minimum, they both
appealed to race-based rhetoric to equate geographical discrimination with racial dis-
crimination. While this point alone does not prove that the Court believed malappor-
104. Id.
105. Peters, 339 U.S. at 278 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
106. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 570 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting).
107. Brief for Appellant at 30, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
108. Id.
109. See 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 3, at 559.
110. GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 251.
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tionment fostered state-sponsored discrimination, Cox's and Rhyne's statements indi-
cate their belief that such rhetoric would resonate with the Court after its unanimous
decision in Gomillion.
VI. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER BELIEVED BAKER CONFLATED RACIAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL
DISCRIMINATION
Justice Frankfurter unleashed a tour de force in dissent.' He believed the majority
opinion compromised the Court's apolitical reputation by illegitimately applying group
discrimination law to a strictly political issue relegated to the states."12 His outrage at
the Court's departure from Colegrove stemmed from his belief that the Court was mir-
ing the judiciary in a "mathematical quagmire"' 13 of redistricting that would undermine
"public confidence in its moral sanction. ' 114
Justice Frankfurter accused the majority of conflating racial and geographic dis-
crimination." 5 He emphasized in a footnote that the case is not a North/South issue;"
16
rather, it concerns an apportionment issue affecting states throughout the country. Later,
he asserted, "This is not a case in which a State has ... denied Negroes or Jews or red-
headed persons a vote, or given them only a third or a sixth of a vote. What Tennessee
illustrates is an old and widespread method of representation-representation by local
geographical division."
'"17
Justice Frankfurter accused the majority of intervening in state political matters on
the false presumption that geographical discrimination was somehow equivalent to ra-
cial discrimination. In a memo written to Justice Stewart during deliberations, Justice
Frankfurter argued that the type of discrimination confronted in Baker involved "cir-
cumstances different 'in kind' from either racism or discrimination based on other fac-
tors. 118 "Disallowing all Christian Scientists or Jews to vote, or to reduce votes in any
county that has Christian Scientists or Jews," he argued "would present circumstances
different 'in kind.' ' 1 9 Justice Stewart was concerned that not extending the reasoning
of Gomillion to Baker could foster other forms of discrimination not touching directly
upon race.120 The fact that Justice Frankfurter could only distinguish these more perni-
cious forms of discrimination from geographic discrimination by characterizing it as
"different in kind," however, proved unpersuasive for Justice Stewart. If the Court
could authorize jurisdiction in more controversial areas like desegregation, Justice
Stewart probably figured that it could do so in an arguably less controversial area of
discrimination that was harming a majority of voters, i.e., urban residents.
11. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). ("The impressive body of rulings thus cast aside reflected the
equally uniform course of our political history regarding the relationship between population and legislative
representation-a wholly different matter from denial of the franchise to individuals because of race, color,
religion or sex.").
113. Id. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 269 n."*" (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
118. SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 415.
119. Id. (footnotes omitted).
120. See id.
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The other justices ultimately did not share Justice Frankfurter's faith in his version
of the political question doctrine. The fact that the federal district and appellate courts
in Gomillion used Colegrove to uphold racially discriminatory districting indicated how
Colegrove could shield racist state officials from judicial review. Justice Frankfurter's
doctrine also provided little guidance as to when courts possessed jurisdiction over dis-
crimination. This confusion and the recognition that legislatures could use Colegrove to
perpetrate racially-charged policies with impunity appear to have been the deciding
factors underlying the majority opinion in Baker. Some members of the Court may have
been more interested in reshaping representative government than in the question of
whether racial discrimination was implicit in Baker. However, the Court's decision to
find probable jurisdiction in Baker only a week after deciding Gomillion, Justice Doug-
las' questions about racial discrimination at oral argument, and the racial insinuations
made by Charles Rhyne and the Solicitor General suggest that race was an implicit issue
in Baker.
VII. AFTERMATH OF BAKER
By 1964, congressional opposition to the Supreme Court's reapportionment deci-
sions took two forms: (1) an effort to amend the Constitution; and (2) jurisdiction strip-
ping. 12 1 The House passed a bill for jurisdiction stripping by a vote of 218 to 175, with
most support coming from Republicans and Southern Democrats. 122 The Senate, how-
ever, proved less adamant in seeking to restrict jurisdiction and did not pass the House
bill. A key argument against the proposed amendment to the Constitution was that such
an amendment would empower states to dilute the rising strength of the African Ameri-
can vote.12 3 The Senate vote failed with fifty-seven voting in favor of the amendment
and thirty-nine against, seven votes shy of the necessary two-thirds.
124
Congressional opposition to apportionment did not prove overwhelming, as evi-
denced by the successful passage of the Voter Rights Act of 1965. Congress passed the
Act three years after Baker to improve African Americans' ability to vote, especially in
the South. Interestingly, Charles Rhyne seems to have predicted such a legislative re-
sponse during oral argument in Baker. Rhyne argued that the Supreme Court did not
need to go so far as to decide that there was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
z5
Rhyne asserted that the Court only needed to hold that federal courts possessed jurisdic-
tion over questions regarding legislative apportionment. 26 It would then be up to the
district courts to determine whether Baker in fact stated a cause of action. 127 In so do-
ing, he hoped that the Tennessee legislature, under pressure from the judiciary, would
reapportion as had the legislatures in New Jersey and Minnesota after their respective
state courts asserted jurisdiction over claims of apportionment. 128 Rhyne's prediction
turned out to be true insofar as state legislatures in general began responding once the
121. See BAKER, supra note 9, at 135.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 137.
124. Id.
125. 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 3, at 563.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 565.
128. Id. at 564.
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Supreme Court declared that federal courts possessed jurisdiction over apportionment.
29
The Voter Rights Act of 1965 embodied the federal government's response to the issue
of malapportionment and other restrictive means employed by the states to deny the vote
to African Americans.
The Voter Rights Act sought to combat the institutional denial of the vote to blacks.
It also became a means by which to promote the election of black officials. 3 ° The Su-
preme Court's presence in the area of representation expanded rapidly after the passage
of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. Following passage of the Act, new statutory causes of
action proved less cumbersome and more effective than constitutional claims.' 3 1 In
response to passage of the Voter Rights Act, Chief Justice Warren declared, "Hopefully,
millions of non-white Americans will now be able to participate for the first time on an
equal basis in the government under which they live."' 132 Within five years of its sign-
ing, registration of blacks in the South nearly doubled, from 29% to 56%.
133
VIII. CONCLUSION
In a broadcast interview two days after his retirement in 1968, Chief Justice Warren
asserted, "I think the reapportionment, not only of State legislatures, but of representa-
tive government in this country is perhaps the most important issue we have had before
the Supreme Court."' 34 This comment is significant in light of the fact that Chief Justice
Warren, as governor of California, oversaw one of the most malapportioned states in the
country and strongly resisted an effort to reapportion the state legislature in 1948.135
While serving on the Supreme Court, he admitted to his clerks that he had been wrong
on the issue when he was governor. 136 Perhaps he had changed his mind after acknowl-
edging that malapportionment impeded representation of racial minorities and urban
majorities. This Note has argued that the civil rights movement, the intransigence of
state officials in effecting desegregation following Brown v. Board of Education,'37 and
the leadership of the Kennedy Administration indicated to Chief Justice Warren and the
other justices of the need to remedy malapportionment. Although race might not have
been the deciding factor in Baker, a review of the events surrounding the case indicates
that the Court was aware that malapportionment could be as much a racial issue as a
matter of urban/rural politics.
129. See DIXON, supra note 3, at 139.
130. See CHRISTOPHER M. BURKE, THE APPEARANCE OF EQUALITY: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING,
REDISTRICTING, AND THE SUPREME COURT 85 (1999).
131. Id.
132. HUDSON, supra note 42, at 67.
133. Id. at 1.




137. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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